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Moses’ Beginning 
ALEXANDER REHDING  
 
All beginnings are complicated, and few more so than the story of Moses. No one felt this 
more acutely than Sigmund Freud, who wrote and reluctantly published his three late essays 
on Moses and Monotheism between 1936 and 1938, just before and after he had to flee his 
native Austria and go into English exile. In his essays he proposed the provocative, though 
not quite unprecedented theory that Moses, the leader of the Jews in Egypt, was in fact 
himself not Jewish but Egyptian. Freud argued that not only was Moses’ name more likely to 
be  derived  from  an  Egyptian  word  than  from  a  Hebrew  root,  but  he  also  pointed  to 
improbabilities in the legend of Moses’ childhood as an adoptee of the Egyptian royal family. 
Freud  knew  that  his  hypothesis  was  likely  to  be  explosive;  the  first  essay,  “Moses  an 
Egyptian,” therefore begins with an apologetic captatio benevolentiae: “To deny a people the 
man  whom  it  praises  as  the  greatest  of  its  sons  is  not  a  deed  to  be  undertaken 
lightheartedly—especially by one belonging to that people.”
1  
Freud knew full well that the beginnings are critical for the processes they set in motion. 
In  fact,  at  least  since  Aristotle’s  Metaphysics,  the  question  of  beginnings  had  been  firmly 
associated with specific qualities that had to be present at least in potentia in order to actualize. 
It is not for nothing the Greek ￿￿￿￿ translates as both “beginning” and “leadership,” (or, 
in a more poetic translation, as both “commencement” and “commandment”
2). In making 
Moses an Egyptian, Freud introduced an awkward twist into the story of the Jews, where 
their originator remained outside of the narrative whose unfolding was triggered by him.  
Freud evidently felt moved to divert from the classic understanding of beginnings, and 
replaced it with what amounted to an apparently vague, but actually radical re-definition of   2 
beginnings: “Everything new must have its roots in what came before.”
3 With this move, 
Freud acknowledged the impossibility of pure origins that spin forth out of themselves, but 
instead  are  related  ever  further  backwards,  in  a  manner  not  dissimilar  from  Nietzsche’s 
Genealogy, to events that lie outside of the main narrative frame. It is particularly noticeable 
that Freud studiously avoided any mention of the problematic concept “beginning” here.  
According to the hypothesis Freud proposed, the elements that make up the Judaic 
religion were not unprecedented; rather, Moses took over a number of trends that had been 
popular at certain times in Egyptian culture—including circumcision, rejection of magical 
rituals, a turn away from the afterlife, and the belief in a single, invisible God.
4 For part of 
this  hypothesis,  Freud  could  rely  on  factual  historical  knowledge  about  Egypt:  such 
monotheistic,  anti-representational  religious  principles  had  in  fact  been  decreed  by 
Akhenaton (ca. 1350-1330 BC) and imposed on Egyptian society during his reign. After his 
death, however, Egyptian culture reverted to the polytheistic, image-saturated, and magical 
religion  that  broadly  characterized  Ancient  Egypt  before,  while  any  reminders  of 
Akhenaton’s  reign  were  thoroughly  excised  from  history.  In  Freud’s  hypothesis,  the 
“historical Moses” was an Egyptian priest, who continued to adhere to the principles of 
Akhenaton’s culture. According to Freud, Moses was forced to flee Egypt with his followers, 
and developed these principles into a form of counter-religion which formed the basis for 
what is now known as the Jewish faith. 
Bible researchers of the 1930s and 40s were less than amused by Freud’s conclusions. 
Martin Buber, the important Hebrew Bible translator, dismissed Freud’s work outright as 
“unscientific” and based on “groundless hypotheses.”
5 Tellingly, Buber did not latch on to 
the later psychoanalytical maneuvers of Freud’s work on Moses, in which Freud interpreted 
the whole Jewish religion as the collective repression of an oedipal murder of the father.   3 
(Freud, mindful of its contentiousness, had in fact originally refrained from publishing this 
part.) Instead, Buber went straight for Moses’ Egyptian roots. For Buber knew as well as did 
Freud what was at stake with this radical interpretive maneuver: “Whoever wishes to make 
an Egyptian of [Moses],” Buber pronounced, “deprives the tale of the foundation on which 
it rests.”
6 The story of Moses was clearly a struggle about the power of beginnings. 
The critical question, however, whose importance Buber refused to acknowledge here, 
was  not  about  the  authentic,  historical  Moses.  It  is  unlikely,  barring  any  sensational 
archaeological discoveries, that any advances can be made on the question of the historical 
figure of Moses. Freud, for his part, was highly aware that he was staking his scientific 
reputation in publishing his interpretive musings on the figure of Moses, which rested, in his 
own words, “on feet of clay,” on flimsy historical evidence.
7 That is to say, Freud was only 
too well aware of what it meant to approach the question of origins from the perspective of 
what  subsequently  “came  of  it,”
8  but  he  still  considered  it  a  worthwhile  pursuit. W h at 
mattered  to  Freud,  then,  was  the  very  different  question  of  how  posterity  chooses  to 
remember Moses, and how it remembers the beginnings of monotheism.  
The Egyptologist Jan Assmann has recently pointed to the political context of 1930s 
Austro-Germany in which this radical redefinition took place. The broader question Freud 
was asking in his late work on Moses was not why the Jews were being persecuted, but 
rather what element in the Jewish faith may have caused anti-Semitism. (It is noteworthy in 
this context that Freud does not speak of the “Hebrews” or the “Israelites,” as a historical 
argument  may  well  have  done,  but  rather  of  the  “Jews”—employing  a  term  whose 
essentialism was at once more timeless and extremely timely in the 1930s.) The reason Freud 
proposed is concerned with the exclusivity that is peculiar to monotheistic religions. As 
Assmann  points  out,  polytheistic  religions  are  “translatable,”  as  the  godheads  almost   4 
invariably represent cosmic elements—the sun, the moon, the stars. Such representations 
can be worshipped with different names in different cultures without problems, since they 
are merely different signifiers to the same signified. It is monotheism, whose exclusivity is 
enhanced by the concomitant image-prohibition, that only makes possible the primordial 
distinction between the true religion and the idolatry of others.
9 
Assmann  suggests  that  Freud’s  answer,  relating  the  beginnings  of  monotheism 
backwards to Moses’ Egyptian origins, was an act of diluting the notion of the uniqueness of 
the  Chosen  People.
10 A t  the  same  time,  this  maneuver  allowed  Freud  to  rescue  certain 
elements of the Jewish faith: for in making Moses an Egyptian it was not Judaism as such 
that was at fault, but rather the primordial distinction into monotheistic religion and false 
idolatry. The purity of Moses’ origin, which Freud jettisoned at the outset of his book Moses 
and Monotheism, barely covered with a fig leaf of regret, was a sacrifice Freud willingly made in 
an effort—historically futile, as it turned out—to undo this fateful primordial distinction.  
 
I 
On the surface, Schoenberg’s opera Moses und Aron, composed between 1930 and 1932, that 
is a few years before Freud’s Moses and Monotheism, appears to circumvent the whole vexed 
problem of Moses’ origins. For ostensibly Schoenberg tackled the problem of the beginning 
by opening in medias res, by jumping in at a later stage of the story: Act I, Scene 1 opens with 
the scene of Moses’ encounter with God in the Burning Bush. We know that Schoenberg 
was deeply engaged with this moment in Moses’ story: not only is it the first scene in the 
opera plot, it was in fact also the first part that Schoenberg conceived; he mentioned Moses 
at the Burning Bush—then still described as a cantata in its own right—as early as 1926 in a 
letter to Webern.
11   5 
If we look a little more closely, however, we find that the opera begins even a little 
earlier: scene 1 does not start, strictly speaking, until a few bars into the score.
12 The opera 
begins before the beginning, so to speak, with just a few chords while the curtain is still 
down. And it is this strange twilight zone—not quite an overture, not quite part of the first 
scene—that I want to explore here. As in Freud’s example, the problem of the beginning 
presents itself primarily as a problem of exegesis. It is important to underline here that I do 
not  mean  this  lightly:  nothing  would  be  more  mistaken  than  to  think  that  interpretive 
problems are any less real, or less important, than any other kind of problems. And the 
strong reactions to Freud’s hypotheses already give us a glimpse of how much can be at 
stake in such a problem of exegesis. In fact, the problem of the beginning of Schoenberg’s 
Moses und Aron is a test case for our urge to charge the beginning with a heightened sense of 
meaning, which is part and parcel of interpretative and analytical practice, in music just as 
much as in other parts of cultural practice.  Ex. 1a 
 
All we hear at the very opening of the opera, as Example 1a summarizes, are six solo 
instruments accompanying six solo voices. Karl Heinz Wörner, the author of the first large-
scale analytical study of Schoenberg’s Moses und Aron, whose observations set the tone for 
generations to come, has described the opening as follows: 
   6 
The chords each have three voices and each is held for three crotchets. The first and last 
chord,  consisting  of  an  augmented  and  a  perfect  fourth,  are  the  same;  both  middle 
chords, consisting of a minor third and an augmented fifth, are the same, save for a 
reversal of the intervals in each chord. The intervallic progression from one chord to the 




For Wörner, this perfect symmetry in the first three bars of the score signifies “God as an 
idea—this concept was taken over by Moses from his ancestors, to whom God had revealed 
himself.  Infinite  God  speaks  at  the  beginning  of  the  opera,  […]  not  in  words,  but  in 
sound.”
14 
Much ink has been spilled about this opening since Wörner’s groundbreaking study of 
1957.
15  The  central  point,  that  the  sounds  are  an  emblematic  representation  of  God’s 
qualities,  as  Moses  announces  only  seconds  later,  has  become  a  cornerstone  of  the 
interpretation  of  the  work.  We  remember,  Moses  addresses  God  as  “einziger,  ewiger, 
allgegenwärtiger,  unsichtbarer  und  unvorstellbarer  Gott”  (“only  one,  infinite,  omnipresent, 
unperceived and inconceivable God.”) The symmetrical perfection of this figure, complete 
with the wonderfully blended and unified sound, would indeed seem to bespeak these divine 
perfections.
16  
For the rest of the opera—and this is the second interpretive cornerstone of Moses und 
Aron—God is most closely associated with the twelve-tone series that forms the exclusive 
basis of the musical material of the opera. The Schoenberg scholar Pamela Cooper-White 
summed this up most concisely: “Schoenberg intended the purest use of his own system, the 
twelve-tone system, to represent God, […] Schoenberg most likely viewed the row itself as a   7 
compositional rule parallel to the Law (Torah) or the Commandments.”
17 Other scholars 
have tried to formalize this association in a systematic manner. The late David Lewin, for 
one, formed analogies between the following two complexes. He argued that the entities or 
characters—God-row,  Moses-composer  (Schoenberg),  Aron-performer,  the  People-
audience—fulfill  equivalent  places  within  their  respective  systems,  the  operatic  and  the 
social.
18 
There is no reason to doubt either of these two interpretive traditions. In fact, both are 
easy to substantiate in the continuation of the opera. There is only one problem: they do not 
go together. Let us go back to Wörner’s interpretation and press him a little harder: his 
description of the musical emblem with which the opera begins seems strangely tortuous, in 
the way he explains the intervals one by one and lists their symmetrical relations. This is 
especially  strange  considering  that  the  analysis  of  twelve-tone  music  has  a  very  precise 
terminology  that  Wörner,  and  many  German  analysts  following  him,  eschew  in  this 
particular instance.  
The  reason  they  have  to  resort  to  this  fairly  cumbersome  description  is  simple:  the 
beginning  emblem  does  not  follow  Schoenberg’s  rules  of  twelve-tone  music.  We  can 
examine this a little more closely. Example 1b shows the opening again, this time with the 
full twelve-tone row (P
0) and its inversion (I
0) in the systems underneath. If we read the rows 
back to front, we can also identify the retrograde (R
0) and the retrograde inversion (RI
0).
19 
Once we consider the beginning emblem in the context of the row formation, we observe 
that it in fact consists of the first three notes of the row and then skips right ahead to the last 
three, omitting the middle six tones. The following lower chords, by contrast, are taken from 
the retrograde inversion of the row. That is to say, if we take our prime form of the row, in 
the middle system of the example, as a starting point, the intervals in the lower system are   8 
mirrored upside down along a central pitch axis, and the order of notes is reversed so that 
the row is played from end to beginning. In other words, what the lower three voices sing 
are the last three notes of the inverted row followed by the first three notes, again leaving 
out the middle six notes.  Ex. 1b 
 
It is only after we hear the emblematic chords at the beginning that the first row is 
completed:  what  happens  is  that  the  chordal  progression  is  repeated  in  the  following 
measures,  and  this  time  the  piano  plays  the  six  middle  notes  that  were  missing  at  the 
beginning. Example 2 shows this schematically just for the first pair of chords, but the same 
is true for the second pair. These “filled-out” repetitions of the chords actually highlight the 
problems surrounding the opening emblem. We may well admire the beautiful symmetries in 




P  1,2,3    
10,11,12 
RI   1,2,3         
10,11,12 
o 
o   9 
the artful design Wörner is disarticulating another aspect of Schoenberg’s compositional 
technique, which would have complicated his interpretation: if the opening emblem does not 
play all the tones of the row but leaves out some of them, the beginning of the opera 
disobeys  the  laws  of  twelve-tone  composition  (and  in  fact  comes  dangerously  close  to 
operating with patterns akin to the twelve-note tropes of Schoenberg’s rival Josef Matthias 
Hauer).  Ex. 2 
 
Schoenberg  himself  commented  on  such  a  scenario.  In  the  important  essay 
“Composition  with  Twelve  Tones,”  written  in  1941,  a  decade  after  Moses  und  Aron,  he 
explained the most fundamental principle of his twelve-tone technique:  
 
It will be observed that the succession of the tones according to their order in the set has 
always been strictly observed. One could perhaps tolerate a slight digression from this 
order (according to the same principle which allowed a remote variant in former styles) 
in  the  later  part  of  a  work,  when  the  set  had  already  become  familiar  to  the  ear. 




P  1,2,3    10,11,12 
P  4,5,6,7,8,9   10 
 
The basic rule that the succession of tones must always follow their order in the set evidently 
does not apply to the opening of Moses und Aron. When we count up the chords we do hear 
twelve notes, it is true, but not the twelve notes of the row. We notice that no fewer than 
four notes are doubled. As Wörner observed initially, the four chords are based on the 
repeated melodic interval A-B, and we could add to this the parallel bass interval Bb-C.  
Schoenberg does not start the opera with a complete statement of the twelve-note row, 
and it seems this is an emphatic gesture. We therefore have a hermeneutic problem: if the 
beginning emblem really represents God’s perfection, eternity and indescribability then it 
does  so  only  while  being  in  breach  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  compositional 
technique closely associated with the divine qualities. If the row signifies divine perfection it 
is hard to imagine that we would begin with a breach of the musical law. Schoenberg’s 
musical representation of God, right at the beginning of the opera, pulls the interpretive rug 
out from underneath its own feet.  
This issue takes us right back to the problem of beginnings, and few beginnings are more 
complicated than that of the story surrounding Moses and Aaron. Freud, as we saw, took the 
question down the narrative path, but this is not the only way to approach the problematic 
beginning.  The  bible  scholar  Ephraim  Urbach  tackles  the  question  from  the  angle  of 
structural efficacy. One crucial problem in the story of Exodus, he points out, raises the 
awkward question: “Why does the bible not begin with the Ten Commandments?”
21 The Ten 
Commandments  clearly  form  the  most  important  part,  indeed t h e  f o u n d ation,  of  the 
Hebrew Bible. In many ways, it is tempting to ask analogously, “why doesn’t Moses und Aron 
begin with the Twelve-Note Row?”   11 
The problem here lies in the analysts’ eagerness to establish too close a connection 
between  the  musical  features  of  the  opening  and  the  divine  qualities  that  Moses  lists 
immediately afterwards. Of course, it is only too tempting to associate words with musical 
features  that  immediately  precede  or  succeed  them—this  is  in  fact  one  of  the  chief 
assumptions of the analysis of vocal music. Just for the purpose of the exercise, let’s take this 
hermeneutic strain one step further: we noticed earlier that the referential pitches in the 
opening emblem are Bb-A-C-B, or in its German pitch designation that Schoenberg would 
have used, B-A-C-H. But should we therefore assume that Schoenberg’s God is Bach?
22 
Even though we know Schoenberg revered Bach, there are good reasons to be hesitant to 
think  that  a  firm  association  between  the  Old  Testament  God  and  the  protestant 
Thomaskantor from Leipzig would be hermeneutically enlightening in this particular context.  
After all, it is precisely representation that is being problematized in the opera. We would 
do well, therefore, to treat tried-and-tested hermeneutic strategies with a large pinch of salt 
in  this  context.  I  do  believe  that  there  is  a  link  between  the  beginning  emblem  and 
Schoenberg’s conception of God through music, but I do not think a trivial one-on-one 
mapping  of  musical  features  onto  levels  of  meaning  will  lead  us  to  a  particularly 
sophisticated understanding of the opera.  Let us hold off the temptation to assign meaning 
to specific musical events and take a step back to look at the larger picture. 
What I would like to propose instead is a fairly close analogy to the problem of “why 
does the Bible not begin with the Ten Commandments?” For a simple example, think about 
those passages of biblical history that precede Moses’ emergence from Mount Sinai with the 
tablets of the law. As the bible scholar Nahum Sarna points out, we should not assume that 
people went around murdering, stealing, and bearing false witness with impunity all the time 
prior to the Ten Commandments. He writes:    12 
 
It  is  taken  for  granted  that  the  Ten  Commandments  comprise  the  minimal  moral 
imperatives essential to the maintenance of an ordered and wholesome society; but here 
again, is there anything uncommon about their contents? What was the state of the 
world prior to the revelation at Sinai? Was it steeped in savagery and barbarism? The 
bible itself assumes the existence of a moral code of universal application from the 
beginning of the appearance of civilized life on this planet. Otherwise, how could Cain’s 
slaughter of his brother have been a culpable offence? For what ‘lawlessness’ could God 
have brought the great Flood, and for what ‘evil’ would the inhabitants of Sodom and 
Gomorrah and their allied cities have been brought to account?
23  
 
One might question whether the two rather more abstract Commandments that are central 
to Moses und Aron—the First and the Second, that is, monotheism and image prohibition—
would also be covered quite so neatly by Sarna’s argument, but it seems fair to conclude 
nonetheless that somehow the fundamental laws that consolidated the Ten Commandments 
were  already  around  even  before  their  manifestation  on  the  tablets.  This  idea  of  an 
emergence in time, and we might say more broadly, this multipolar, non-linear conception of 
time, is what the literary scholar Erich Auerbach, in the celebrated opening chapter of his 
influential study, Mimesis, identified as a specifically biblical form of time.
24 
Such a principle can be seen at work in the twelve-tone technique in Schoenberg’s opera. 
The row is always already there—the musical emblem would make no sense if we did not 
recognize it as a fragment of the row, but the row has not manifested itself before the opera 
proper begins. In the ill-defined space that demarcates the few measures after the beginning   13 
   14 
of the opera, but before the beginning of the first scene, the basic building material only 
gradually emerges as a fully fledged row.  
 
II 
Music is surprisingly good at expressing this form of gradual emergence in time, and it has a 
long tradition of putting this procedure into practice. Witness that most famous piece of 
Western music, Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony: its beginning, reproduced here in Example 3, 
is the paragon of a musical creatio ex nihilo—as if out of nothing, with glimmering string 
tremolos  out  of  which  motivic  fragments  emerge  and  finally  come  together  in  the  first 
theme. The musicologist Leo Treitler even goes one step further. He has made the evocative 
suggestion that the real beginning of the piece is not the first note that we hear, but rather 
the silence that precedes the initial tremolo.
25  Ex. 3 
Such techniques of emergence on the musical stage were brought to perfection by none 
other than Richard Wagner, which in the operatic context of Moses und Aron is particularly 
pertinent. Take the famous infinite Eb-major sound with which Rheingold opens: the gradual 
build-up of the Eb-major sonority over something like seven minutes is a much-discussed 
example of such an emergence.
26 Its significance, however, is only partially captured if we 
ignore what happens immediately afterwards. Example 4 shows that when the harmony 
eventually shifts to Ab major this is not the end of the sonic creation of the world, but we 
actually move on to the next step in this evolutionary history of music: instrumental music 
turns into vocal music as the Rhinemaidens start singing. And even there, as Jean-Jacques 
Nattiez has pointed out, we can observe a form of emergence: the Rhinemaidens begin with 
a surge of what are largely nonsense syllables: “Weia! Waga! Woge, du Welle, walle zur Wiege! 
Wagalaweia! Wallala, weiala weia!”
27 Out of these watery sounds, initially intoned as a    15 
   16 
   17 
pentatonic  melody,  a  fully  formed  language  with  grammar  and  vocabulary  evolves  only 
gradually.  Ex. 4 
As a further example, Wagner’s final music drama Parsifal employs a comparable strategy 
of progressing from noise to speaking to singing. At the beginning of Act II, the magician 
Klingsor summons up Kundry, the enigmatic female in a male world. As she awakes from 
her trance-like sleep, she responds with a terrible scream, followed by “a loud wail that 
subsides to a frightened whimper.”
28 Wagner, who was very specific about the sounds he 
wanted to hear, gave Kundry a number of sighs for the first articulated noises, “Ach! Ach!” 
Only  gradually  do  words  form:  “Tiefe  Nacht!  Wahnsinn... O h !   Wut...  Ach!  Jammer!  Schlaf… 
Schlaf… Tiefer Schlaf! Tod!” (“Oh!—Oh! Darkest night! Madness! O rage! O misery! Sleep ... 
sleep ... Deep sleep! Death!”)
29 Her first fully formed sentence is the alliterative “Da, da dient’ 
ich.” (“There—there I served.”) After this slow awakening, as we remember, Kundry, swiftly 
regains full musical and linguistic competence and becomes extremely eloquent for the rest 
of Act II. This example, whose expansiveness makes it awkward to reproduce the music 
here, shows a much more complex interaction of the emergence of both language and (sung) 
music out of silence and noise, in a manner that subsumes the earlier two examples. 
And where, we might ask rhetorically, would Schoenberg be without Wagner?
30 With this 
very brief history of musical emergence in mind, we can return to Moses und Aron: because 
this idea not only touches on the question of the row but is intimately linked with the 
complicated question of spoken words and singing. 
 
III 
To start with, the chordal emblem we examined earlier—the beginning music that is “not-yet 
the row,”—is presented by wordless singing; we hear the sound of the vocal ensemble, but it   18 
cannot be fairly described as vocal music in any meaningful sense. The six solo voices form 
an integral part of the overall soundscape; it is not by accident that Schoenberg wanted for 
them to be placed in the orchestra pit. In fact, for much of the first scene the six solo voices 
sing a text that is doubled in the Sprechstimme of the chorus. While chorus and solo voices 
intone the same text passages at the same time, each group moves in different rhythms that 
unfold independently from one another. The effect of this is quite extraordinary, as anyone 
who  knows  the  opera  will  remember—it  could  be  called  a  kind  of  heterophony  that 
juxtaposes singing and speaking.
31 
The first scene is fully based on the row, though in a form that is largely determined by 
the  formation  of  motives,  such  as  the  chords  that  we  heard  at  the  opening.  Melodic 
presentations  of  the  whole  row  do  not  occur  here.  Moses’s  Sprechstimme,  meanwhile,  is 
notated in precise but unordered intervals, which have only a very tentative affinity to the 
procedures based on the row.
32 Instead, Moses’s part moves in independently developed 
intervallic motives and spoken melodies. While in Act I, Scene 1, the solo voices and the 
orchestra take a very intricate motivic approach to the twelve-tone material that handles the 
order of tones with a certain degree of liberty, it is noteworthy that after the beginning of 
Scene 1 proper the row statements are usually complete. 
This can be illustrated with a short example. Example 5 shows a passage with the six 
solo voices and the Sprechstimme chorus, intoning the same text in their kind of heterophony. 
The solo voices are bound by the material of the row: the first measure is a full statement in 
which the row is distributed among all three parts. Even though the soprano part may seem 
more melodic, it is nonetheless fully integrated with the other voices. The solo voices are 
always treated as an entity here: no one part ever presents the full row, and conversely, the 
row always furnishes both melodic and harmonic elements. In fact, the second measure is   19 
nothing but a retrograde of the same material; it is sung in reverse. The F#, the peak note in 
the middle, is claimed by both sides of this musical palindrome. The Sprechstimme chorus, 
meanwhile,  does  not  engage  in  this  reversal  of  the  material:  their  rhythms  march  on 
relentlessly.  Ex. 5 
 
It is not until the second scene of Act I that we hear the first sung melodic statement of 
the  row,  reproduced  in  Example  6.  Appropriately  enough,  it  is  Aron—the  great 
communicator,  the  man  of  the  people—who  presents  it  to  us  in  his  opening  words  to 
Moses: “Du Sohn meiner Väter, schickt dich mir der große Gott?” (“O son of my fathers, are you 
sent by mighty God?”) Moses, meanwhile continues his Sprechstimme in unrelated intervals, 
responding: “Du Sohn meines Vaters, Bruder des Geistes, aus dem der Einzige sprechen will, vernimm 
mich und ihn, und sage, was du verstehst.” (“O son of my father, brother in spirit, through whom 
the only one is to speak, now hear me and him, and tell me what you perceive.”) Incidentally, 
the subtle difference in the way the two brothers address each other is highly significant: 
All 12 notes of the row  Retrograde of the same row 
Sprechstimme rhythms continue   20 
Moses is the “son of [Aron’s] forefathers”—in the plural. Moses’ spiritual ancestorship goes 
back to the first generations, to whom God spoke directly. Aron, by contrast, is the “son of 
[Moses’s] father” in the singular—he cannot make the same spiritual claims as his brother, 
but he is much more firmly grounded in the familial and social ties of his world.  Ex. 6 
 
The organization of voice and music here is very different than in the first scene. As we 
see  here,  Aron’s  vocal  part  is  written  out  as  independent  melodic  entities  that  are  not 
replicated in the orchestra. The role of the orchestra is at once more accompanimental and 
more independent: it forms its own textures and motives that bear no direct links to Aron’s 
part.  
Finally, after Aron continually fails to grasp the magnitude of God’s mission for Moses 
and himself, an exasperated Moses starts singing himself. He sings, in Example 7, a full 
statement of the row, to the important words: “Reinige dein Denken, lös es von Wertlosem, weihe es 
Wahrem:  kein  andrer  Gewinn  dankt  deinem  Opfer.”  (“Purify  your  thinking.  Free  it  from  the 
worthless. Dedicate it to the true. No other reward is given your offerings”) This is the only 
time  Moses  overcomes  his  speech  impediment  and  breaks  out  of  the  shackles  of  his 
Sprechstimme. We will not hear him sing again for the rest of the opera. From there on the 
roles are clearly distributed: God will speak to Moses, but Aron will be his mouthpiece.  Ex. 7 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 (etc.)   21 
 
At this point, we should perhaps add one further musical example demonstrating the 
range  of  possibilities  of  gradual  emergence  in  music:  Haydn’s  late  oratorio  The  Creation, 
whose famous introduction, “The Representation of Chaos,” (“Die Vorstellung des Chaos”) 
begins with nothing but a dully assertive C in octaves that still leaves open all possibilities. 
Over the next measures the music begins to explore them tentatively: first by adding an 
unexpected Eb, suggesting a C minor harmony, but immediately thwarting this notion by 
adding an equally surprising Ab. It is not until the end of Raphael’s following recitative that 
the  emergent  beginning  can  be  said  to  have  reached  a  breakthrough.  But  what  a 
breakthrough it is: to the words “Let there be light”— the epitome of the sublime, ever since 
Longinus’ Peri hypsous—the full chorus answers with a blindingly radiant C-major fortissimo: 
“And there was light.” It is only then, some ten minutes into the oratorio, that the potential 
that was implicit right from the outset is realized in the music.   Ex. 8 
 
   1         2   3             4           5      6                 7   8           9    10  
11 
1
2   22 
This heightened moment of Haydn’s Creation only derives its meaning in connection with 
the music leading up to it. Just as it would be wrong to isolate this latter moment in Haydn’s 
Creation, so it would be misguided in Moses und Aron to conclude that the more obvious 
melodic, sung approach to the twelve-tone material was somehow superior to the more 
involved motivic and chordal approach Schoenberg favors in the first scene. In fact, in many 
ways the highly sophisticated use of the material in Scene 1 is just as typical of Schoenberg’s 
twelve-tone  style  on  the  whole.
33  In  this  context,  however,  where  the  problems  of 
representation and communication are central, the eventual appearance of the row on the 
musical surface—as a sensual presentation and as reification at the same time—would seem 
to mark a significant moment in the opera. It marks a breakthrough to the sung surface, a 
breakthrough in a very literal sense, which can help us come to terms with the complexities 
of the beginning of the story of Moses und Aron. 
 
IV 
The literary scholar Roland Barthes has pointed out that there can be moments that have 
significance but no meaning.
34 His observation is a useful distinction in our search for an 
interpretation of the opening moments of Schoenberg’s Moses und Aron. A direct mapping of 
music onto the nearest available text may be a natural instinct, a common strategy in the 
analysis of vocal music, but it does not necessarily lead us in the right direction.
35 
Schoenberg’s own penchant for number games and anagrams does not make this task 
any easier. In their contributions to this volume both Eitan Agmon and Eric Zakim point 
toward the paradox of Moses und Aron that the title of this towering intellectual and artistic 
modernist  chef  d’oeuvre  was  ultimately  determined  by  a  trivial  superstition,  Schoenberg’s 
persistent  trikaidekaphobia.  Likewise,  Schoenberg’s  love  for  anagrams  (he  called  his  son   23 
Ronald, in clear reference to his own first name), and for translating the letters of names into 
musical notes is well documented. In this sense, it is useful to revise what we earlier said 
about the pitches B-A-C-H that frame the initial emblem. It is almost beyond doubt that 
Schoenberg would have been aware of the significance of these notes, and that he would 
have deliberately arranged the notes in this way in reference to Bach’s name. Yet they do 
not, in Barthes’ terms, carry any meaning. In other words, we are not forced to turn this 
observation into a meaningful feature of our interpretation.  
Carl Dahlhaus has drawn attention to the problem of meaning in the context of what he 
called  Schoenberg’s  “aesthetic  theology,”  whose  foundation  he  saw  in  Jewish  mysticist 
traditions. Dahlhaus’s conceit links directly back to Sarna’s earlier enquiry into the position 
of  Ten  Commandments  within  the  Hebrew  Bible:  for  Dahlhaus,  the  vantage  point  of 
understanding  Schoenberg  should  not  proceed  from  a  “hard  and  fast  meaning”—which 
would issue forth from the very beginning—but the assumption of “a possibility of meaning 
which can be updated in various directions.”
36 This seems nowhere more pertinent than at 
the outset of Moses und Aron, a beginning before the beginning. 
And let’s remember that, while there is a clear technical aspect to the problem of the 
beginning of Schoenberg’s Moses und Aron, it is a problem of exegesis—no less so than the 
interpretive specter Freud raised in his Moses und Monotheism. It seems that Edward Said is 
grappling with something very similar when he argues, “the beginning is the first step in the 
intentional  production  of  meaning.”
37  It  is  important  here  to  appreciate  the  fine-tuned 
definition, where the beginning is nothing but the “first step.” We can thus read Said here as 
a caveat not to rush out to find all meaning in the beginning. Sometimes this will lead us to 
interpretive short-circuits. We are well advised to remember that sometimes meaning needs a 
little time to get going. (Said leaves the question unanswered—perhaps wisely so—whether   24 
the  “end”  would  constitute,  by  analogy,  the  last  step  in  the  intentional  production  of 
meaning.) In the case of Schoenberg’s Moses und Aron, the opening emblem is a model of 
contrapuntal and sonic significance, unparalleled in its density for the rest of the opera. Yet 
its meaning only unfolds over the course of the first three scenes, when the full range of 
Schoenberg’s twelve-tone language that he adopts in the opera is fully explored.  
It is critical to remember that the opening emblem is set off from the dramatic beginning 
of the opera. That musical meaning and verbal signification do not map neatly onto one 
another is perhaps the most concise expression of the problematic of representation, which 
is, after all, the central problem of the opera, right from its opening bars. In this sense, it is 
appropriate,  perhaps  painfully  so,  as  it  runs  counter  to  our  instincts  to  seek  meaning 
wherever we can find it, not to delve into a conclusion that would triumphantly sweep aside 
all previous attempts at interpretation and instead tie up the strands of our analysis into a 
new exegesis of row-structure-mapped-onto-plot. Any such renewed conclusiveness would 
do violence to the spirit of the work and its problematic of representation. This is not to 
abandon our responsibility as interpreters: we have undeniably covered considerable ground 
here. The real realization, meanwhile, is the ironic acceptance that all we have done—all we 
can do—it to expand the purview of the beginning.  
The beginning of Moses und Aron is not simply found in the emblem to which most 
analytical efforts have been directed, but rather in that which follows. In a similar vein, 
Freud’s exegete, Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, has drawn attention to the fact that in Freud’s 
Moses and Monotheism it is “not only the ‘origin’ of a religion that should engage us, but ‘what 
has come out of it’”
38 The interpretation of the beginning of Moses und Aron as a gradual 
process toward a breakthrough, is such a first step in the creation of a specifically musical   25 
meaning that aims not to seek refuge in the ensuing text, plot or image, that in other words 
eschews the elements of representation.  
Here,  too,  Moses’  sigh  “Meine  Zunge  ist  schwer,”  seems  to  apply  to  the  musical 
processes  that  we  have  drawn  on  in  our  exploration  of  the  beginning.  This  mode  of 
analytical endeavor tries to stay aloof of ready-to-hand Aron-esque signification, but it comes 
at the price of a certain clunkiness, where somewhat inelegant analogies to other musical 
processes of gradual comings-into-being are the best interpretive pointers we can provide. 
But, of course, just as Moses realizes in one of his most purist moments that he cannot fully 
escape the constraints of representation, so these reflections bring with it—inevitably—the 
risk of embedding Schoenberg’s work in a historical trajectory that relates it back to Wagner 
and Viennese Classicism. As a composer, Schoenberg may have personally approved of this, 
but  it  also  implies  that  the  pure  abstraction  that  Moses’  monotheism  was  searching  for 
remains elusive. After all, we remain captivated by the inescapable beginning. 
The conclusion, however, that we are, after all this, still only at the beginning is not a bad 
one. For it is precisely by continuing to be beholden to the beginning, by tarrying over this 
first step in the production of intentional meaning, that we can get closer—significantly so—
to the heart of the problem of meaning in Schoenberg’s Moses und Aron.  
 
CAPTIONS 
Ex. 1a: The opening emblem of Moses und Aron 
Ex. 1b: The row qualities of the opening emblem 
Ex. 2: Full twelve-tone chromaticism in the opening 
Ex. 3: Creatio ex nihilo in Beethoven, Symphony no. 9 
Ex. 4: The Rhinemaidens start singing in Wagner’s Rhinegold   26 
Ex. 5: Row treatment in Act I, Scene 1 
Ex. 6: Row treatment in Act I, Scene 2 
Ex. 7: Moses sings 
Ex. 8: The beginning of the “Representation of Chaos” from Haydn’s Creation and the 
blazing C major of the chorus singing “And it was light.” 
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